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ABSTRACT 
Recent events involving the deaths of unarmed, African American citizens have brought forth an 
increased attention to the application of qualified immunity to law enforcement.  This study aims 
to gain a civilian perspective on qualified immunity.  Qualified immunity, as defined by the 
Supreme Court case Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), grants government officials 
performing discretionary functions immunity from civil suits unless the plaintiff shows that the 
official violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 
person would have known.”  Through a national-level survey, this study captures an overall 
favorability of qualified immunity as well as explores the impact of race and situational elements 
using an experimental vignette that had three manipulated parts randomly assigned to 
participants (N = 840).   Results showed that overall support for qualified immunity is split down 
the middle, but after accounting for other sociodemographic factors, support is significantly more 
prominent in White respondents.  In an experiment manipulating race of the officer, race of the 
driver, and the situation, the situational elements held more weight in influencing the responses 
than race.  This split in support points to a possible tipping point towards its abolition, as 
supported by recent abolition in select jurisdictions. 
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 Since the latter part of the last decade, there has been an increasing concern about the 
disproportional amount of unarmed African American men, women, and children being killed by 
the police.  To make matters worse, the officers involved in the shootings rarely face criminal 
charges nor are they able to be sued in civil cases because they were protected under qualified 
immunity.  Such killings have sparked outrage that has fueled movements such as Black Lives 
Matter (henceforth BLM) and hashtags on social media such as #HandsUpDon’tShoot, 
#ICan’tBreathe, #BreonnaTaylor.  When one breaks down the events that have taken place, it is 
not difficult to identify the source of this outrage. 
 The year 2014 seemingly started it all.  In July, while on the street in New York City, 
Eric Garner, a particularly large (6’2”, 395lbs), African American man, was allegedly selling 
loose cigarettes (Baker, Goodman, & Mueller, 2015).  When NYPD officers confronted and 
attempted to arrest him, he was put in a chokehold and pinned down by multiple officers (Baker, 
Goodman, & Mueller, 2015).  The ordeal was caught on cell phone video, and viewers can 
clearly hear Garner repeatedly (11 times) exclaim, “I can’t breathe!” (Baker, Goodman, & 
Mueller, 2015). Garner eventually lost consciousness and died at the hospital (Queally, 2014).   
 In August 2014, the shooting of Michael Brown occurred in Ferguson, Missouri (Mejia, 
2014).  According to Officer Darren Wilson of the Ferguson Police Department, while 
responding to a theft in process, Brown was reaching for his gun while Wilson was in his police 
car (Mejia, 2014). Wilson alleges that Brown charged at him, leading him to shoot his gun at 





narrative and says that Wilson started the altercation by grabbing Brown’s neck when he was 
next to the vehicle, prompting Brown to flee, turn around, and raise his hands in surrender before 
Wilson shot at him multiple times (Mejia, 2014).  In the investigation of the incident, there were 
several conflicting eyewitness statements with a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and 
Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation finding that Officer Wilson acted in self-defense—
even though Brown was unarmed— (Berman, 2014).  The incident sparked protests and civil 
unrest in Ferguson, repeating the phrase “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot,” which was met with a 
militarized response from area law enforcement (Tribune wire reports, 2014).  Wilson was later 
called to a grand jury where he was not indicted (Sneed, 2014); this was only the beginning. 
 A mere two months later, in Cleveland, Ohio, Tamir Rice, a 12-year-old African 
American boy was killed by Officer Timothy Loehmann of the Cleveland Police Department 
(McCarthy, 2014).  Initially, Loehmann, along with his partner, Frank Garmback, were 
dispatched to the call being advised that there was a male pointing a pistol at random people 
(McCarthy, 2014).  The 9-1-1 caller said that the gun was “probably fake” and that it was 
“probably a juvenile”, although none of that was revealed by the dispatcher on the original call 
for service.  As seen by surveillance footage, Loehmann shot at Rice almost immediately after 
arriving at the scene (McCarthy, 2014).  Rice was not pointing the gun at the time of the officers’ 
arrival; his hands were in his jacket pockets, and the toy gun was in his waistband (McCarthy, 
2014).  When responding to a command to show his hands, Rice took his hands out of his 
pockets and, before he had a chance to finish the motion, he was shot (McCarthy, 2014).  He 
died the next day in the hospital (McCarthy, 2014).  When the case was brought to a grand jury, 
they declined to indict the officers (Fantz, Almasy, & Shoichet, 2015). 





Table 1: Notable Cases from 2015-2019 
Year Victim Location Situation Punishment 
2015 Deven Guilford Eaton Co., MI Shot by Sgt. Jonathan Frost in a traffic stop over Frost’s 
headlights a 
No charges 
2015 Walter Scott North Charleston, SC Shot in the back while fleeing from by Ofc. Michael 
Slager (caught on camera) b 
20 years in prison 
(second-degree 
murder) 
2016 Daniel Shaver Mesa, AZ Shot in hotel hallway by Ofc. Philip Brailsford.  Shaver 




2016 Alton Sterling Baton Rouge, LA Shot by Ofc. Blane Salamoni while he and Ofc. Howie 
Lake II had him pinned down. Sterling was thought to be 
reaching for a gun (caught on camera) d 
No charges e 
2016 Philando Castile Falcon Heights, MN Shot by Ofc. Jeronimo Yanez while performing a traffic 
stop.  Castile was thought to be reaching for a gun. 





2016 Terence Crutcher Tulsa, OK Shot by Ofc. Betty Shelby after Crutcher approached his 
stalled SUV and not complying to Shelby’s commands g 
Acquitted 
 
2018 Botham Jean Dallas, TX Was shot in his own home by neighbor, Ofc. Amber 
Guyger, who was off duty, but still in uniform.  Guyger 




2019 Atatiana Jefferson Fort Worth, TX Was shot in her own home through a window by Aaron 
Dean after Dean was responding to a non-emergency call 
about Jefferson’s door being open.  Jefferson was armed 
but acted in self-defense. i 
Indicted 
(murder) 
Notes: (a) Balko, 2015; (b) Dwyer, 2017; (c) Friedersdorf, 2018; (d) Belinger, Valencia, & Almasy, 2016; (e) Fausset & Blinder, 






Concern over the deaths of unarmed Black people at the hands of the police came back to 
the forefront in 2020 following the deaths of Breonna Taylor and George Floyd.  In March, 
Taylor, 26, who was an emergency room technician in Louisville, KY, was shot to death in her 
home after Louisville police executed a no-knock warrant searching for her ex-boyfriend, who 
was allegedly using her home to sell drugs (Oppel Jr., Taylor, & Bogel-Burroughs, 2021).  
Taylor was lying in bed with her boyfriend, Kenneth Walker, when they heard a battering ram 
strike their front door (Oppel Jr., Taylor, & Bogel-Burroughs, 2021).  When they both called out 
to see who it was at the door, no one answered, so when the door was broken down, Walker fired 
his gun, striking an officer in the thigh (Oppel Jr., Taylor, & Bogel-Burroughs, 2021).  In 
response to the initial gunshot, several gunshots were fired into the residence, hitting Taylor; she 
died shortly thereafter (Oppel Jr., Taylor, & Bogel-Burroughs, 2021).  The man in question, 
Jamarcus Glover, was later arrested (unrelated to Taylor’s death) and said that Taylor was not 
involved with the operation, further purporting her innocence (Oppel Jr., Taylor, & Bogel-
Burroughs, 2021).  
Since the incident, there have been protests and outcry on social media and in-person 
demanding the officers involved be held accountable.  In June, the Louisville council passed a 
law that banned no-knock warrants in the city and named it after Taylor (Reiss & Waldrop, 
2020), but that was before any charges were brought before the officers involved.  It was not 
until September that the officers were brought before a grand jury, only for one of them to be 
charged with wanton endangerment (Miller & Tobin, 2020).  In accordance with Kentucky state 
law, “A person is guilty of wanton endangerment in the first degree when, under circumstances 





which creates a substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person” which is 
a Class D felony (Miller & Tobin, 2020).  In short, the officer was only being charged for the 
rounds that missed Taylor.  It was not until January 2021 that Officer Joshua Jayne (who secured 
the no-knock warrant) and Detective Myles Cosgrove (the shooter) were fired from the 
department (Booker, 2021). 
Two months following Taylor’s death, George Floyd was killed.  The event took place in 
Minneapolis, MN, after Floyd was accused of using a counterfeit $20 bill (Hill et al., 2020).  
Multiple cell phone videos displayed the ever-escalating ordeal of his arrest.  Floyd appears 
cooperative and was handcuffed but a struggle ensued when he was being put inside the car (Hill 
et al., 2020).  Eventually, Floyd was pulled out of the car onto the street and laid face down, still 
handcuffed (Hill et al., 2020).  Bystanders were still filming the arrest mere feet away and 
witnessed three officers holding down a defenseless Floyd while one stood by and watched (Hill 
et al., 2020).  The arrest concluded with Officer Derrick Chauvin’s knee on Floyd’s neck for 
eight minutes and forty-six seconds, all while Floyd is pleading for the officer to get off of him, 
exclaiming multiple times that he could not breathe (Hill et al., 2020)—a call back to Eric 
Garner.  As bystanders are watched and filmed, they too pled with Chauvin to take the knee off, 
even trying to physically intervene before being blocked off by the assisting officers standing 
idly by.  Floyd eventually lost consciousness (around the seven-minute and twenty-six second 
mark) and died with a knee in his neck; he was 46 (Hill et al., 2020).  The video of the incident 
went viral on social media and news outlets alike, with outrage felt worldwide. 
However, police relations among minority communities did not worsen overnight.  From 
the inception of slave patrols to the Civil Rights era, relations between the police and the African 





Furthermore, one mainstay of this tumultuous relationship has been the lack of accountability 
faced by officers who “sadistically and maliciously” use force during arrests.  The year 2014 was 
not the start of this behavior—and subsequent acquittal—for law enforcement.  Of the more 
notable incidences, perhaps the most similar in response to those mentioned earlier would be that 
of Rodney King.  In 1991, King was driving under the influence in Los Angeles, CA, and led 
police on a high-speed chase (Sastry & Bates, 2017).  When the police finally stopped him and 
attempted to arrest him, they “kicked him and beat him with batons for a reported 15 minutes” 
while more officers stood by instigating the incident; the ordeal was also caught on camera 
(Sastry & Bates, 2017).  King suffered numerous injuries from the beating, including permanent 
brain damage (Sastry & Bates, 2017).  When it came time to discipline the officers involved over 
a year later, the four officers involved were all acquitted (Sastry & Bates, 2017).  That decision 
left Los Angeles in shambles as a result of riots and unrest that occurred throughout the city 
(Sastry & Bates, 2017).  Although King survived to tell his story, unfortunately, others in his 
position have not.  Names like Amadou Diallo—a man who was shot at 41 times by four plain-
clothes officers of the New York Police Department in 1999 (Fritsch, 2000)—Kathryn 
Johnston—an elderly woman who was shot in the execution of a no-knock warrant in Atlanta, 
GA, (similar to Breonna Taylor) in 2006 (CNN, 2008)—and Sean Bell—who, among two other 
friends, was shot at 50 times by New York Police Department after leaving his bachelor party in 
2006 (Johnson, 2019)—have been immortalized in history as victims of police misconduct. 
Although these cases are tragic, a partnering source of outrage is the lack of consistency 
in holding the officers accountable.  In the Diallo case, the four officers involved with second-
degree murder but were acquitted at trial (Fritsch, 2000); the officers involved in the Bell 





Kathryn Johnston and Breonna Taylor show the most inconsistency across parallels.  Aside from 
the shootings occurring in different states over a decade apart, the circumstances are nearly 
identical.  Yet, the officers involved in the Johnston case were tried and convicted, while those of 
the Taylor case were charged with crimes unrelated to her death and only recently fired from 
their department (Booker, 2021).  Officers being fired, albeit a step in the right direction, is not 
enough for many community members.  In incidents that involve the officer drawing and firing 
his/her gun, the common first step is to suspend them while the investigation is conducted.  This 
is meant to ensure the officer’s due process; however, it can appear to the public as leniency or 
even a reward for the officer.   
As much as the knee-jerk reaction desires for immediate termination, the removal of the 
officer is only partially helpful.  Often, the officers involved can be hired by another department.  
For example, Officer Loehmann (shot and killed Tamir Rice) was hired by another Ohio 
department four years after the incident (Vera, 2018).  Perhaps the solution lies within the 
standard operating procedures.  If officers are trained under policies that better outline the proper 
procedure, perhaps it could lessen the frequency of the incidences in the future.  Unfortunately, it 
is incredibly difficult to proactively outline every possible scenario that an officer would 
encounter, and policies are often updated after an incident occurs (see e.g., Breonna’s Law; Reiss 
& Waldrop, 2020).   
As we scramble to find the solution, one that has emerged is the removal of the 
application of qualified immunity from law enforcement.  Qualified immunity, as defined by the 
Supreme Court case Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), grants government officials 
performing discretionary functions immunity from civil suits unless the plaintiff shows that the 





person would have known.”  This legal principle is not exclusive to law enforcement nor is it 
meant to intentionally stifle compensation for victims of police brutality.  As it applies to law 
enforcement, when officers are not found to have violated their protocol, they are protected from 
being sued.  The department itself can still be sued and often settle, but should they choose not to 
settle, the officer would be protected.  If qualified immunity is amended to no longer apply to 
law enforcement, the threat of monetary loss on the part of the officer may serve as a powerful 
deterrent to the unreasonable use of force.   
Problem Statement 
 As cases of unarmed Black men and women being shot and/or brutalized by law 
enforcement pile up, the lack of accountability creates an exponential cycle of injustice.  When 
combined with vague policies and officer discretion, qualified immunity protects officers from 
personally being held accountable for their actions.  To increase accountability, some have called 
for doing away with such immunity policies; but it is unknown the breadth of the support for 
such actions as well as the potential conditional nature of support for such efforts.   
What to do with Qualified Immunity 
 There are credible concerns with retaining qualified immunity as well as with doing away 
with it.  On the one hand, outside of reform occurring elsewhere in policing, the pattern of 
unaccountability would continue, and justice would constantly fall short.  However, if qualified 
immunity protections were stripped from law enforcement, the floodgates could open to the 
frivolous lawsuits that such immunity was designed to prevent.  For example, if in the execution 
of a foot-chase, an officer runs through a prized garden and ruins it, the gardener could sue the 





that officer would and should be protected from a suit such as that; but the problem arises when 
officers are acting outside of their role as a law enforcement officer and their conduct is not (a) 
explicitly codified or (b) the codified behavior is detrimental to those who are being policed.   
Purpose of the Study 
 This study is meant to understand the support for removing qualified immunity as well as 
consider how race may play a factor in the application and perception of qualified immunity.  
Because qualified immunity is rarely discussed (and less so in social science publications), 







CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Police Accountability  
As civilians, we are held accountable by police officers; if a law is broken, the 
expectation is that those responsible suffer the consequences, but from the appropriate source.  
When the lawbreaker is a member of law enforcement, they also must be held accountable, 
whether it be from their superiors, the community, a court of law, or a combination thereof.  
Notable methods of police accountability include civilian review boards, Internal Affairs Units, 
body-worn cameras, and criminal lawsuits. 
Civilian Review Boards 
 As described by Udi Ofer in the Seton Hall Law Review (2016), “the concept behind a 
civilian review board is a simple one: civilians and not police personnel should have the power to 
investigate and make findings on police officer wrongdoing” (p. 1039).  As the name suggests, 
officers are reviewed by community members to hold them accountable.  This method originated 
in the 1940s but did not gain ground until the 1960s and 1970s, during the height of the Civil 
Rights Era (Ofer, 2016).  The Civil Rights Era was a period of increasing concerns about police 
brutality and having a civilian review board was a way that community members believed they 
could address this problem.  Today, four different types of civilian review boards exist: (1) those 
that investigate allegations and suggest discipline to the appropriate source, (2) those that review 
the findings of internal investigations, (3) those that allow civilians to appeal the findings of 
internal investigations and a board to review the process itself, and (4) those that serve as 
auditors of police complaints (Ofer, 2016).  To conclude his article, Ofer emphasizes the 





Arguably, a weak civilian review board is worse than no civilian review board because it 
gives the illusion of independent accountability but provides little to no accountability.  A 
weak civilian review board can lead to an increase in community resentment, as residents 
go to the board to seek redress yet end up with little (p. 1052). 
 In an analysis of civilian review boards in Newark, NJ, Alecia McGregor (2016) shows 
how politics may influence civilian review boards and, more broadly, police accountability.  
Historically, Newark law enforcement has a tarnished past involving civil rights violations.  
McGregor (2016) notes: 
By most accounts, police-community tensions in Newark peaked in July of 1967, after 
taxi driver John Smith was beaten and dragged into a police station by Newark police 
officers.  This event sparked a 5-day uprising that ultimately resulted in 26 deaths, 24 of 
whom were African American civilians, and most were killed by police firearms (p. 144).   
When met with advocacy for a civilian review board, then-mayor Hugo Addonizio (who was 
Italian-American) was opposed to the idea (McGregor, 2016).  Even as Addonizio was unseated 
by Kenneth Gibson (African American) in 1970, there was still political opposition to a civilian 
review board (McGregor, 2016).  It was not until 1997, following the Rodney King incident and 
a local incident involving Newark police, that there was political advocacy, when Mayor Sharpe 
James endorsed civilian review boards only to walk it back in the face of police opposition 
(McGregor, 2016).  As racial tensions in Newark grew throughout the 1990s into the 2010s, a 
civilian review board remained absent until 2015, when Mayor Ras Baraka implemented it via 
executive order (McGregor, 2016).  The 38-year gap across mayors between peak desire and 






Internal Affairs Units 
 As the name suggests, internal affairs units are designed to conduct investigations of 
police officers from within.  As defined by The Balance Careers’ Timothy Roufa (2019): 
“In law enforcement, [Internal Affairs] is the department that investigates allegations of 
wrongdoing by police currently serving on the force. Because they are investigating 
fellow officers, the department is separated from the force-at-large and report to an 
investigative board or the agency's chief.  Law enforcement officers must be held to the 
highest ethical standards. So, sometimes mistakes can rise to a level that requires a full 
internal investigation and possibly severe discipline” (n.p.). 
Theoretically, internal affairs units are an effective way for police to police themselves.  
However, as Rachel Moran purports in her article in the Buffalo Law Review (2016), the concept 
of internal affairs is a “farce” created by a combination of five elements: (1) citizens being 
deterred by police departments to report misconduct, (2) failure to investigate reports, (3) biased 
investigations that favor the officer, (4) reproachable excessive force investigations, and (5) 
resistance to requiring serious discipline.  A design flaw with internal affairs units is that the 
officers conducting the investigation are not present during the precipitating incident.  Before the 
possibility of recording the police, filing a complaint with these investigative bodies often 
created a case of the officer’s word against that of the complainant.  However, Moran (2016) 
provides an example of how video evidence expedites the investigation process:  
The Seattle Police Department has also had a number of incidents in which police 
officers used racial slurs against minorities, including one in which an officer was 





officers at the scene witnessed this incident, none reported it, and the police department 
did not discipline the officer until a civilian bystander made public a video of the incident 
(p. 866). 
A common theme among most of the incidents mentioned in Chapter 1 of this thesis is that they 
were caught on camera.  Video evidence serves to fill the gaps in the narrative of police 
misconduct and provide a clearer explanation as to why a complaint was filed.  However, not 
everyone has access to a recording device nor should they be expected to record every instance 
of their daily lives.  This issue is meant to be solved by body-worn cameras. 
Body-Worn Cameras 
 After the events of 2014, there was an increase in support for police wearing body 
cameras from officers, community members, and the courts (Coudert, Butin, & Le Métayer, 
2015).  The recent increase in the use of body-worn cameras is one that is felt internationally, as 
departments in the United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium, and France have all tested the use of these 
cameras prior to 2015 (Coudert, Butin, & Le Métayer, 2015).  Regarding accountability, body-
worn cameras are, as Coudert, Butin, and Le Métayer explain: 
They act as a transparency mechanism, subjecting to scrutiny that so far was limited to 
the parties to the interaction. Video surveillance is here targeted to specific events, places, 
and people. Because it is mobile, it can happen everywhere, anytime. Its use is thus 
highly intrusive into the privacy of both citizens, who see their encounters with police 
documented, and police officers, who are being placed under (constant) monitoring 





Body-worn cameras have shown positive effects in reducing civilian complaints, as 
observed in a 2015 study conducted by Barak Ariel, William A. Farrar, and Alex Sutherland in 
the Journal of Quantitative Criminology.  The experiment was conducted in Rialto, California, 
and divided the officers into control and experimental groups, with the latter wearing cameras 
(Ariel, Farrar, & Sutherland, 2015).   
The outcomes suggest a reduction in the total number of incidents of use-of-force 
compared to control-conditions. We have also observed nearly ten times more citizens’ 
complaints in the 12-months prior to the experiment, compared to any of the three years 
prior to the experiment (p. 25). 
Criminal Lawsuits 
 Unfortunately, the footage from body-worn cameras is not a guaranteed smoking gun.  
Often, the camera is not on or is only turned on at a time after contextual events have occurred.  
Take the shooting of Samuel DuBose, for example.  This incident happened in 2015 at the 
University of Cincinnati.  After Officer Ray Tensing pulled over DuBose for driving without a 
front license plate, he asked for Dubose’s driver’s license, which he did not show (Coolidge, 
Grasha, & Horn, 2016).  When Tensing tried to open DuBose’s car door, DuBose pulled it shut 
with his left hand while starting the ignition with his right hand while exclaiming, “I ain’t even 
do nothing!” (Coolidge, Grasha, & Horn, 2016).  In response, Tensing reached into the car with 
his left hand, yelled, “Stop!” and fired a single shot into DuBose’s head (Coolidge, Grasha, & 
Horn, 2016).  The entire stop was caught on Tensing’s body-worn camera (Coolidge, Grasha, & 
Horn, 2016).  When the case came under adjudication, Tensing said that he was scared he was 
going to be run over by DuBose when the car was started (Sewell, 2017)—despite the video 





was eventually dropped after multiple trials (Sewell, 2017).  The University of Cincinnati 
eventually settled for $5.3 million to DuBose’s family (Sewell, 2017). 
 While settling outside of court can provide a healthy compensation, the accountability of 
the officer (or the lack thereof) is not addressed.  It should not be in a police department’s best 
interest to pay out millions of dollars each time one of its officers kills someone.  Even when all 
else fails (see previous methods of accountability), a judge and/or jury can determine the 
punishment for the officer.  However, as Kate Levine’s article in The Georgetown Law Journal 
(2016) explains, criminally charging police officers rarely results in a conviction.   
Prosecutors decline to charge officers who kill (often unarmed) suspects at an extremely 
high rate.  Although recordkeeping by the federal government has been extremely poor, 
academics, citizens, and media outlets have begun their own collection of reports.  A 
thorough analysis by the Washington Post and researchers at Bowling Green State 
University uncovered that, out of thousands of fatal shootings by law enforcement 
officers since 2005, only fifty-four had been charged or indicted (pp. 763-764). 
Given the close relationship between law enforcement and prosecutors, it can be incredibly 
conflicting for the latter to pursue charges (Levine, 2016).  Often, charges are not applied unless 
in egregious offenses (Levine, 2016).  Furthermore, those seeking justice through civilian 
litigation of officers are met with a similar fate due to qualified immunity. 
Legal History of Qualified Immunity 
 As previously iterated, qualified immunity is the legal protection from lawsuits granted to 
government officials acting within their duties and its origins date back to 1896.  In the case of 





question when he “was directly in the line of duty when…he informed claimants that they were 
under no legal obligation to respect any transfer, assignment or power of attorney, which section 
3477 of the Revised Statutes declared to be null and void.”  The case established the following: 
The same general considerations of public policy and convenience which demand for 
judges of courts of superior jurisdiction immunity from civil suits for damages arising 
from acts done by them in the course of the performance of their judicial functions apply 
to a large extent to official communications made by heads of Executive Departments 
when engaged in the discharge of duties imposed upon them by law. 
From there, qualified immunity was argued thrice more.  The first of which was the case of Barr 
v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), where the petitioner was the Acting Director of the Office of 
Rent Stabilization, William G. Barr (not to be confused with the former Attorney General) and 
issued a press release about the respondents, Matteo and Madigan, that received massive media 
attention.  Matteo and Madigan sued for libel and alleged malice on the part of Barr, but the 
Court held that the petitioner's plea of absolute privilege in defense of the alleged libel must be 
sustained (pp. 360 U. S. 564-578). 
The second case of Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) involved the Department of 
Agriculture.  The respondent of this case alleged that individual members of the Department, “by 
instituting unauthorized proceedings against him, they had violated various of his constitutional 
rights.”  The following is what happened through the lower courts: 
The District Court dismissed the action on the ground that the individual defendants, as 
federal officials, were entitled to absolute immunity for all discretionary acts within the 





entitled only to the qualified immunity available to their counterparts in state 
government. 
Furthermore, the case established that neither the Barr case nor the Spalding case supported the 
petitioner’s contention of absolute immunity.  
The case of Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) is how the current definition of 
qualified immunity came about.  The case itself involved President Nixon’s presidential aides 
(represented as Harlow) who were alleged to have conspired to violate Fitzgerald’s rights 
involved in the case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, ante, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).  Fitzgerald, a 
management analyst within the Department of the Air Force under the Lyndon B. Johnson 
administration, had testified before Congress about “cost overruns and unexpected technical 
difficulties concerning the development of a particular airplane.”  Following Nixon’s 
inauguration, Fitzgerald was dismissed and alleged his dismissal as retaliation for his testimony.  
The case was heard well after Nixon’s resignation and the Court found that Nixon had absolute 
immunity for the actions alleged by Fitzgerald.  When the case against Harlow was heard, the 
Court found that qualified immunity applied to presidential aides as well as they did not clearly 
violate Fitzgerald’s rights. 
 It is also worth distinguishing between absolute immunity (which the Butz case was 
arguing) and qualified immunity.  The former provides immunity regardless of the lawfulness of 
the actions, while the latter only protects actions that followed the protocol.  Law enforcement 
officers are granted qualified immunity as their departments are operated under a codified set of 
procedures.  However, an issue arises when the protocols the officers follow are not specific 
enough to provide a unanimous interpretation.  For example, in 2004, Malaika Brooks, an 





refusing to sign her ticket, she was tasered three times and arrested.  After the incident, Brooks’ 
case eventually was brought to the 9th Circuit panel, and “[t]hat court eventually sided with 
Brooks, but also said the officers were immune to Brooks’ constitutional claim because the law 
was ‘not sufficiently clear at the time of the incident’” (KOMO Staff, 2014).  Incidents like that 
show that even when the officers have been found to have acted unconstitutionally, qualified 






CHAPTER 3: REVIEW OF RELEVANT THEORIES 
Conflict Theory 
 Conflict theory might best be applied to help understand the use of qualified immunity in 
policing.  At its core, conflict theory assumes an unequal and coercive society.  The power 
dynamics that characterize this stratified system are reinforced by social institutions, such as law 
and the police (Althusser, 1971).  “Conflict theory holds that law and the mechanisms of its 
enforcement are used by dominant groups in society to minimize threats to their interests posed 
by those whom they label dangerous, especially minorities and the poor” (Petrocelli, Piquero, & 
Smith, 2003; p. 1).  In other words, theoretically, the laws are made to benefit those who write 
them and to damage those “below them.”   These are also the same groups who are likely to 
experience force by the police (Jacobs & O’Brien, 1998).  Thus, these groups are most likely to 
be the subjects of police abuse of power (Harring, 1983).  Therefore, they are also the most 
affected by the (mis)use of qualified immunity.  
“Class, race, sex, age, ethnicity, and other characteristics that denote social positions in 
society determine who gets apprehended and punished.  Thus, the economically and 
socially disadvantaged groups of lower class, minorities, youth, women, and others will 
be similarly disadvantaged and differently processed through the criminal justice system” 
(Akers, Sellers, & Jennings, 2017; p. 212). 
The laws that conflict theorists point to are not explicitly against a certain group of people but 
instead set parameters that impact only a specific group of people.  As early conflict theorist 





[T]he whole political process of law making, law breaking, and law enforcement 
becomes a direct reflection of deep-seated and fundamental conflicts between interest 
groups and their more general struggles for control of the police power of the state.  
Those who produce legislative majorities win control over the police power and dominate 
the policies that decide who is likely to be involved in violation of the law (pp. 208-209). 
Furthermore, the verbiage of the laws that are passed does not explicitly target a certain 
population but rather appears neutral and equitable.  For example, a policy that is meant to target 
those of lower socioeconomic status would not contain rhetoric like, “If you make less than $X, 
you can only vote at times your employer will require you to work.”  Instead, the policy would 
say, “Based on your address, the only polling place you can cast your ballot is here,” which, 
superficially, is equal, but when applied across all socioeconomic statuses, the policy is applied 
differently; socioeconomic status and convenience of polling places share a positive relationship 
(Barreto, Cohen-Marks, & Woods, 2009).  While voter suppression is an oasis for conflict 
theorists, there are other ways the theory can apply. 
 As applied to modern American government, conflict theory would classify the laws 
written by the legislature as detrimental to those who do not write them.  For example, in 2017, 
then-President Donald Trump and his administration passed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA).  
The act was designed to lower the taxes of Americans but also had a built-in delayed tax 
increase—set to trigger in 2021—that would adversely affect those who make under $75,000 a 
year (Stiglitz, 2020).  At the time of Stiglitz’s (2020) opinion piece, about 65% of taxpayers fall 
under that threshold.  As conflict theory explains, Trump’s policy is meant to target those lower 
on the socioeconomic ladder by taxing them more and effectively allowing the rich to get richer.  





surmised—correctly, so far—that if they waited to add the tax increases until after the 2020 
election, few of the people most affected were likely to remember who was responsible” (n.p.), 
effectively dodging responsibility from a court of public opinion.    
 Turning back to policing, as Chambliss and Seidman (1971, p. 269 quoted in Petrocelli, 
Piquero, & Smith, 2003), summarize, conflict theorists view law enforcement through the 
following propositions: 
1. The agencies of law enforcement are bureaucratic organizations. 
2. An organization and its members tend to substitute for the official goals and norms of 
the organization’s ongoing policies and activities that will maximize rewards and 
minimize the strains on the organization. 
3. This goal substitution is made possible by: 
a. The absence of motivation on the part of the role-occupants to resist pressures 
toward goal substitution; 
b. The pervasiveness of discretionary choices permitted by the substantive 
criminal law and the norms defining the roles of the members of law 
enforcement agencies; and 
c. The absence of effective sanctions for the norms defining roles in those 
agencies. 
4. Law enforcement agencies depend on political organizations for resource allocation. 
5. Organizations will minimize strains on themselves by processing those who are 






6. Therefore, it may be expected that law enforcement agencies will process a 
disproportionately high number of the politically weak and powerless, while ignoring 
the violations of those with power (p. 2). 
These propositions argue that law enforcement officers give those who do not hold power over 
them more attention than those who do hold such power.  Often, the placement of power aligns 
with the races of the officer and suspects, with white people historically holding more power 
(Petrocelli, Piquero, & Smith, 2003).  “[T]he police have a lower threshold of suspicion for 
Blacks as opposed to Whites, which manifests itself in the police having ‘one trigger for Whites, 
another for Blacks’” (Petrocelli, Piquero, & Smith, 2003; p. 3).   
 As it pertains to qualified immunity, conflict theory would posit that laws surrounding 
qualified immunity are written by those in power and benefit civil servants, who hold power over 
the general public, in such a way that if something goes awry, qualified immunity protects these 
civil servants, arguing that these actors were merely “doing their job.”  Since qualified immunity 
protections are given to those who have followed the written protocol (or rather “not to have 
violated it”), problematic and unspecific verbiage can afford protections for actions that would 
appear otherwise improper.  Furthermore, in cases without precedent, such protections are 
granted as well.   
The issue is further exacerbated when qualified immunity is applied to law enforcement.   
For example, in the case of Corbitt v. Vickers, No. 17-15566 (11th Cir. 2019), the defendant, 
Vickers, was a deputy sheriff in Coffee County, Georgia, who intentionally fired his gun at a dog 
and inadvertently shot Corbitt’s ten-year-old son, SDC, wounding him.  As the officers 





Then, “while the children were lying on the ground obeying [Vickers’s] orders . . . 
without necessity or any immediate threat or cause, [Vickers] discharged his firearm at 
the family pet named ‘Bruce’ twice.” The first shot missed, and Bruce (a dog) 
temporarily retreated under Corbitt’s home. No other efforts were made to restrain or 
subdue the dog, and no one appeared threatened by him. Eight or ten seconds after 
Vickers fired the first shot, the dog reappeared and was “approaching his owners,” when 
Vickers fired a second shot at the dog. This shot also missed the dog, but the bullet struck 
SDC in the back of his right knee. At the time of the shot, SDC was “readily viewable” 
and resting “approximately eighteen inches from . . . Vickers, lying on the ground, face 
down, pursuant to the orders of [Vickers]” (p. 3; italics added).  
When the case was initially heard in 2014, Vickers filed a motion for dismissal on the 
grounds of qualified immunity but was denied.  However, when the case was eventually heard by 
the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, the decision was reversed, and Vickers was granted his 
qualified immunity; the argument being that Vickers had not violated any clearly established 
rights.  Vickers was granted qualified immunity because there was nothing established that could 
condemn his actions.  This case is similar to what happened to Malaika Brooks (mentioned in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis) in that an officer was granted qualified immunity due to a lack of a 
policy condemning such actions.  
Considering cases like that of Corbitt, conflict theorists could hypothesize that qualified 
immunity is written in a way that provides loopholes for officers, while also providing minimal 
effort to correct or hold the officer accountable for their behavior.  The added clause of 
specificity also provides a loophole, as changing a detail in the slightest can trigger a new 





the gunshot hitting a minor adjacent to him, the shot entered a neighboring yard a struck 
someone.  That officer could then argue that since his actions did not match Vickers’s actions to 
the letter, he should be protected by qualified immunity.  
In sum, conflict theory might be best used to understand not only the creation of the 
qualified immunity law but also its use and support for its use, specifically as it pertains to race 
and in the context of law enforcement.  This is the matter at hand that this thesis will attend to in 






CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
Methods 
Current Study 
 Considering the recency of the qualified immunity debate, literature from a social science 
standpoint is close to nonexistent.  Qualified immunity is more of a legal concept applicable to 
entities outside of law enforcement, so it is understandable that the literature surrounding it is 
lacking.  As a pioneer of this research, I am presented with a tremendous opportunity to expand 
research on qualified immunity from a social sciences point of view; especially addressing how it 
is implied empirically.  This study seeks to answer the following questions: 
Research question 1: What is the current level of support for qualified immunity in 
the context of policing? 
Research question 2: Does the race of the officer or civilian in a traffic interaction 
affect public opinion on the applicability of qualified immunity to law enforcement? 
Research question 3: What matters more to the public: the race of the officer or the 
race of the driver in a traffic interaction? 
Based on how the experiment is designed, I have developed the following hypotheses: 
H0: Manipulating the races will have no significant effect on participants' opinions on the 
scenarios. 






H02: Those with a white driver will significantly condemn the actions (i.e., deem these 
actions as more unacceptable, more likely to view the actions as criminal, more likely to 
view the actions as warranting of a lawsuit by the driver/family of the driver) of the 
officer compared to that of a black driver. 
H03: The presence of a white officer in an encounter, as opposed to a black officer, will 
result in greater support for the officer's actions (i.e., deem these actions as more 
unacceptable, more likely to view the actions as criminal, more likely to view the actions 
as warranting of a lawsuit by the driver/family of the driver). 
H04: The race of the respondent will significantly affect the support for qualified 
immunity. 
Data 
The data used in this thesis came from a national-level survey carried out between 
October 3 and 4, 2020, using Amazon’s MTurk program.  As part of a larger project, the survey 
included questions pertaining to several criminal justice topics, including qualified immunity.  
Furthermore, this convenience sample contained an experimental vignette, which included 
random assignment to elements within the experiment.  Participants were given a scenario in 
which an officer pulls over a male community member and asks the driver to step out of the 
vehicle.  The race of the officer, the race of the community member and what happens after the 
driver is asked to step out of the vehicle are randomly assigned.  A total of N = 923 respondents 








The first dependent variable contained the definition of qualified immunity established by 
Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982), along with the arguments for those who favor it or oppose it, to 
ensure all participants have a working knowledge of the concept.  The question associated with 
this asked the participants whether they favor or oppose qualified immunity and included a 
“don’t know” option.   
Following the experimental manipulation described above, a series of follow-up 
questions were asked.  The first question asked the participants if they deemed the officer’s 
behavior acceptable using a 5-item continuous scale ranging from 1 = “acceptable” to 5 = 
“unacceptable.”   
The second follow-up question asked if they thought the officer’s behavior should be a 
crime in a dichotomous “yes” (= 1) or “no” (= 0).  This also contained a contingency question.  If 
participants answered “yes,” they were instructed to indicate what the punishment should be for 
the officer.  Response options to this contingency question used a 5-item scale ranging from a 
fine/probation (= 1) to more than 10 years in prison (= 5).  
The final follow-up question asked all participants if they thought the driver/his family 
should be able to sue the officer, with response options of “yes” (= 1) or “no” (= 0).  This is an 
especially necessary question because qualified immunity is what can block the driver/his family 
from filing such a lawsuit. 
Independent Variables 
 Preceding the question about qualified immunity are two questions meant to gauge the 





measured by a series of 6 statements about police legitimacy in a random order in which 
participants indicated their agreement on a 5-item scale ranging from “strongly agree” (= 5) to 
“strongly disagree” (= 1); the latter is measured by a series of 8 statements in a random order in 
which indicated their likeliness to call the police on a 4-item scale ranging from “extremely 
unlikely” (= 1) to “extremely likely” (= 4). 
Participants were then presented with the experimental vignette with three key elements 
manipulated.  The experimental question reads as follows: 
A [Manipulation A] male officer conducts a traffic stop in which the driver, a 
[Manipulation B] male community member, was speeding 10 miles over the speed limit. 
When the officer asks the driver to step out of the vehicle [Manipulation C]  
 
All three manipulations were filled in randomly for the participants.  Manipulations A 
and B indicated whether the individual was either “white” or “black” while Manipulation C 
presented one of four different outcomes:  
(1) the driver complies and verbally consents to a search of their vehicle. While 
searching, the officer discovers cocaine in the vehicle and arrests the driver  
(2) the driver resists leading to the officer trying to remove the driver from their vehicle. 
In the midst of the scuffle the officer ends up shooting and killing the driver  
(3) the driver complies but is then thrown to the ground by the officer, placed in 
handcuffs, and taken to jail for resisting arrest; or  
(4) the driver resists the request and instead reaches for a handgun that is visibly laying 
on the passenger seat.  The officer reacts by shooting and killing the driver. 
In all, there were 12 possible combinations participants were presented with; each combination 






 At the conclusion of the survey, participants were asked a series of personal questions.  
They were first asked their year of birth, which was used to determine the participants’ age by 
taking the difference between their answer and 2020.  Next, they were asked about their highest 
level of education with options ranging from “less than high school” (= 1) to a “doctoral degree” 
(= 7).  They were then asked about their race.  Initially, the response options were White, Black 
or African American, American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or Pacific 
Islander, Hispanic/Latino, Middle Eastern, Mixed Race, or Other, but based on the data, the 
responses were consolidated to [white, black, Hispanic and other; or white and non-white].  Sex 
is the final question, with options of male, female, and other. 
 Following the se questions, participants were asked to indicate their income from the 
previous year (or their best guess) before taxes, measured on a 7-item scale with ranges spanning 
from 0 to $9,999 (= 1) to $100,00+ (= 7).  Additionally, respondents were asked about their level 
of employment, which was initially measured as full-time, part-time, temporarily laid off, 
unemployed, retired, permanently disabled, homemaker, student, or other, but they were 
consolidated to full-time vs everything else.  These questions were included because the level of 
police interaction can vary across different tax brackets and sociodemographic characteristics. 
 Participants were also asked if they were employed within the criminal justice (i.e., law 
enforcement, courts, corrections) using response options of “yes” (= 1) or “no” (= 0).  As one 
can gather, being an employee of the criminal justice system can alter one’s opinions of law 
enforcement and their behavior.  Similar logic can be applied to the next question, which asked 
the participants if they had (1) taken college classes about criminology or the criminal justice 





and (5) to carry out a sentence in a jail or prison; all of these provided response options of “yes” 
(= 1) or “no” (= 0). 
 Participants were also asked about their marital status.  Originally, the options presented 
were single, never married; married, living with spouse; cohabitating, separated, divorced, 
widowed, and domestic partnership, but these will be consolidated to married vs everything else. 
 Perhaps the most telling of the control variables is the question about the racial 
composition of the participants’ neighborhoods (primarily, the percentage of African American 
residents).  Respondents self-identified their neighborhood’s racial composition as nearly all 
residents are Black (≥90%; = 1), a majority are Black (>50%; = 2), the neighborhood has a mix 
of people (between 25% and 50%; = 3), and nearly all residents are non-Black (≤10%; = 4).   
 Finally, participants were asked about their political viewpoint and affiliation.  The 
former was measured on a 6-item scale ranging from very liberal (= 1) to very conservative (= 5) 
(with a “not sure” option; = 6); the latter was also asked on a 6-item scale with the options 
Republican, Democrat, Independent, Not sure, No preference, Other.  Going forward, the latter 
variable will be consolidated to Republican vs everything else as, lately, there has been division 
in the support for the retention of qualified immunity from within the Republican party (Carney, 
2020). 
Analytic Plan 
 The analysis will begin with a descriptive look at the dependent variables.  Next, I will 
look at the bivariate relationship between the dependent variables and independent variables with 
specific attention to the impact of the respondent’s race on the four dependent variables.  Finally, 





question are measured as continuous variables, multivariate analyses of these questions will be 
analyzed through an OLS-regression, while follow-up questions 2 and 3, which were 





CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
Results 
 To determine the support for qualified immunity and the role race plays in its support, the 
data was analyzed in three phases. First, I assess the descriptive statistics of the sample, 
specifically attending to its sociodemographic characteristics. Second, bivariate statistics explore 
the relationship between race and the key dependent variables. Finally, using multivariate 
modeling (Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and logistic), I examine the relationship between race 
and the key dependent variables after accounting for sociodemographic characteristics and 
related experimental manipulations.   
Descriptive Statistics 
After listwise deletion of those who answered “Don’t Know” to whether they support 
qualified immunity, the N was reduced from 924 to 840 participants.  Of those 840, about half 
(49.76%) answered that they favored qualified immunity (see Table 2).  Before participants were 
presented with the information about qualified immunity, they were first asked questions to 
gauge their existing level of police legitimacy and cooperation with police.  The average 
response for police legitimacy (3.41) indicates an indifference or slight agreement in police 
legitimacy, with a standard deviation of 0.99.  Responses for cooperation with police follow a 
similar pattern.  With a mean of 3.12 and a standard deviation of 0.56, the average participant is 
somewhat likely to call the police.   
Demographically, respondents were in between the ages of 20 and 75 (mean=38.81; 
SD=11.26), were, on average, college educated (mean=4.78; SD=1.16), earned an average of 





Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
VARIABLES MEAN|% STANDARD 
DEVIATION 
RANGE 
Favored qualified immunity? 49.76%  -- 0-1 
Acceptable behavior? 
  Acceptable 
  Slightly Acceptable 
  Neither Acceptable nor Unacceptable 
  Slightly Unacceptable 














Crime? (yes) 66.19% -- 0-1 
If so, punishment?  
  Fine/probation 
  1 year 
  5 years 
  10 years 














Lawsuit? (yes) 70.68%  -- 0-1 
Age 38.81 11.26 20-75 
Education 4.78 1.16 2-7 
Race (white) 71.67%  -- 0-1 
Sex (female) 36.07%  -- 0-1 
Income 4.14 1.38 1-7 
Employment (full-time) 83.81%  -- 0-1 
CJS Employment 28.92% -- 0-1 
Marital Status (married) 64.44%  -- 0-1 
Residential Race Composition  
  Nearly All Black (90+%) 
  Majority Black (> 50%) 
  Mix (25% < x < 50%) 












Political Viewpoint 2.94 1.29 1-5 
Political Affiliation (Republican) 39.17%  -- 0-1 
Police Legitimacy 3.41 0.99 1-5 






viewpoint (mean=2.94; SD=1.29).  Moreover, the population was 71.67% white, 36.07% female, 
83.81% employed full-time—28.92% employed in the criminal justice system—64.44% married, 
and 39.17% self-identified as Republican.  In terms of residential race composition, 10.12% 
lived in a “nearly all black” neighborhood, 17.26% lived in a majority black neighborhood, 
34.88% lived in a mixed neighborhood, and 37.77% lived in a non-black neighborhood. 
The vignettes had 12 possible combinations, all assigned at random.  Table 3 shows a full 
breakdown of the frequency in which each combination was answered.  When presented with the 
experimental vignette and subsequent follow-up questions, the average participant found the 
officer’s behavior to be neither acceptable nor unacceptable (mean of 3.34; SD = 1.56), but 
32.02% found the behavior unacceptable.  The following question—asking if the officer’s 
behavior should be criminal—yielded a “yes” from 66.19% of the population.  Of that sample, 
the average participant thought the behavior warranted a punishment of 5 years in prison (mean 
of 2.47), with only 18.62% choosing a sentence greater than or equal to 10 years in prison.  After 
consideration of the scenarios, 70.68% thought the officer should be sued by the driver or his 
family.  
Bivariate Statistics 
 To answer how respondent race affects favoring qualified immunity and the answers to 
the vignette follow-up questions, responses to each question was compared for white and non-
white respondents.  In response to favoring qualified immunity, just under half of white and non-
white respondents (49.83% and 49.58% respectively) favored qualified immunity (see Table 4).  
These differences were not statistically significantly different.   





Table 3: Sample Size for Intersection of Vignette Variables 
Officer/Driver Combination Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
White Officer/White Driver 45 44 58 63 
White Officer/Black Driver 55 54 47 62 
Black Officer/White Driver 50 37 50 56 
Black Officer/Black Driver 54 53 55 57 
Note: Scenarios  
1. the driver complies and verbally consents to a search of their vehicle. While searching, 
the officer discovers cocaine in the vehicle and arrests the driver 
2. the driver complies but is then thrown to the ground by the officer, placed in handcuffs, 
and taken to jail for resisting arrest  
3. the driver resists leading to the officer trying to remove the driver from their vehicle. In 
the midst of the scuffle the officer ends up shooting and killing the driver 
4. the driver resists this request and instead reaches for a handgun that is visibly laying on 







Table 4: Bivariate Relationship between Favoring Qualified Immunity and Respondent Race  
 
Race No Yes 
Non-White 120 (50.42%) 118 (49.58%) 
White 302 (50.17%) 300 (49.83%) 
 





22.42% of the time, “slightly acceptable’ 12.13% of the time, “neither acceptable nor 
unacceptable”  8.97% of the time, “slightly unacceptable” 24.42% of the time, and 
“unacceptable” 30.06% of the time.  Non-white respondents answered “acceptable” 17.65% of 
the time, “slightly acceptable’ 7.98% of the time, “neither acceptable nor unacceptable” 7.56% 
of the time, “slightly unacceptable” 29.83% of the time, and “unacceptable” 36.97% of the time 
(see Table 5).  The differences in response are statistically significant with a 99% confidence 
interval. 
Over half of white and non-white respondents (64.12% and 71.43%, respectively) 
indicated that they believed the officer’s behavior to be a crime, which were not statistically 
significantly different (see Table 6).  In response to what the punishment should be, white 
respondents answered “fine/probation” 27.46% of the time, “1 year incarceration” 25.13% of the 
time, “5 years incarceration” 27.20% of the time, “10 years incarceration” 11.92% of the time, 
and 10+ years incarceration” 8.29% of the time.  Non-white respondents answered 
“fine/probation” 21.76% of the time, “1 year incarceration” 32.94% of the time, “5 years 
incarceration” 33.53% of the time, “10 years incarceration” 3.53% of the time, and 10+ years 
incarceration” 8.24% of the time.  The differences in response are statistically significant with a 
99.9% confidence interval (see Table 7).  Regarding whether a lawsuit should be filed, over half 
of white and non-white respondents (67.39% and 78.99%, respectively) said that the officer 
should be sued for his actions.  These differences were also significant with a 99.9% confidence 
interval (see Table 8).   
Multivariate Statistics 
 For this part of the analysis, each dependent variable (favoring qualified immunity and 





Table 5: Bivariate Relationship between Acceptability of Officer Behavior and Respondent Race 










42 (17.65%) 19 (7.98%) 18 (7.56%) 71 (29.83%) 88 (36.97%) 
White 147 (24.42%) 73 (12.13%) 54 (8.97%) 147 (24.42%) 181 (30.06%) 
 






Table 6: Bivariate Relationship between “Should it be a crime?” and Respondent Race 
Race No Yes 
Non-White 68 (28.57%) 170 (71.43%) 
White 216 (35.88%) 386 (64.12%) 
 






Table 7: Bivariate Relationship between Punishment and Respondent Race 










37 (21.76%) 56 (32.94%) 57 (33.53%) 6 (3.53%) 14 (8.24%) 
White 106 (27.46%) 97 (25.13%) 105 (27.20%) 46 (11.92%) 32 (8.29%) 
 






Table 8: Bivariate Relationship between Ability to Sue and Respondent Race 
Race No Yes 
Non-White 50 (21.01%) 188 (78.99%) 
White 196 (32.61%) 405 (67.39%) 
 






see which variables affected the answers to those questions.  This was done over a series of 
models for each dependent variable, with each model adding more variables to the equation.  
Model 1 (except for “favoring qualified immunity,” which skips to Model 2) only considers the 
vignette manipulations (race of the officer, race of the driver, and the scenario) and how each 
option affected the answer.  Model 2 adds the race of the respondent to the equation along with 
the vignette manipulations.  Model 3 adds in the rest of the control variables. 
 For the dependent variable of favoring qualified immunity, the models show respondent 
race becoming significant when moving from Model 1 to Model 2 (see Table 9).  When 
considering every variable (Model 2), the following variables showed a significant effect in how 
one favored qualified immunity: race, education, income, CJS employment, marital status, 
political viewpoint, political affiliation, police legitimacy, and cooperation with police.  Of note, 
those married, compared to all others, were over twice as likely (odds ratio [OR] = 2.132) to 
favor qualified immunity, which was the largest effect in this model. 
 For the dependent variable of acceptability of the officer’s behavior in the vignette, 
neither the race of the officer nor the race of the driver significantly affected the results; only 
scenarios 2 and 3 compared to scenario 1 were statistically significant (99.9% confidence) in the 
first model (see Table 10).  Compared to scenario 1, those viewing the other scenarios found the 
officer’s behavior more unacceptable.  When race of the respondent was added, it too was 
statistically significant (95% confidence)—along with scenarios 2 and 3—and had a negative 
relationship with acceptability.  However, respondent race is no longer significant when the 
remaining variables are added to the model (Model 3).  The following variables showed 
significance in Model 3: age, sex, income, CJS employment, marital status, residential race 





Table 9: Multivariate Analysis: Favoring Qualified Immunity 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
 b SE OR b SE OR 
Race 
  White 



















Age -- -- -- -0.010 0.007 0.990 
Education -- -- -- 0.214 0.082 1.250** 
Sex (female) -- -- -- -0.202 0.170 0.815 
Income -- -- -- -0.142 0.066 0.871* 
Employment -- -- -- -0.294 0.247 0.743 
CJS Employment -- -- -- 0.481 0.202 1.625* 
Marital Status -- -- -- 0.761 0.192 2.132*** 
Residential Race 
Composition 
-- -- -- -0.184 0.097 0.834 
Political Viewpoint -- -- -- 0.249 0.070 1.277*** 
Political Affiliation -- -- -- 0.457 0.178 1.586** 
Police Legitimacy -- -- -- 0.559 0.096 1.744*** 
Cooperation with Police -- -- -- 0.409 0.168 1.511* 
Constant -0.017 0.130 0.983 -4.369 0.768 0.012*** 
McFadden R-Squared 3.782x10-6     0.193 






Table 10: Multivariate Analysis | Acceptability of Police Behavior 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
 b SE β b SE β b SE β 
Manipulation A 
  White (ref.) 





























  White (ref.) 





























  Scenario 1 (ref.) 
  Scenario 2 
  Scenario 3 
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Age -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.008 0.004 -0.058* 
Education -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.021 0.044 -0.016 
Sex -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.382 0.092 -0.117*** 
Income -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.083 0.035 -0.073* 
Employment -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.091 0.130 0.022 
CJS Employment -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.493 0.114 0.143*** 
Marital Status -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.295 0.106 0.091** 
Residential Race 
Composition 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -0.245 0.053 -0.153*** 
Political Viewpoint -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.111 0.038 0.092** 
Political Affiliation -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.034 0.102 0.011 
Police Legitimacy -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.164 0.052 0.104** 
Cooperation with 
Police 
-- -- -- -- -- -- 0.269 0.089 0.096** 
Constant 4.077 0.121 -- 4.248 0.140 -- 3.418 0.396 -- 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.196 0.201 0.360 
Note: ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; scenario 1: the driver complies and verbally consents to a 
search of their vehicle. While searching, the officer discovers cocaine in the vehicle and arrests 
the driver; scenario 2: the driver complies but is then thrown to the ground by the officer, placed 
in handcuffs, and taken to jail for resisting arrest; scenario 3: the driver resists leading to the 
officer trying to remove the driver from their vehicle. In the midst of the scuffle the officer ends 
up shooting and killing the driver; scenario 4: the driver resists this request and instead reaches 
for a handgun that is visibly laying on the passenger seat. The officer reacts by shooting and 








be said with 99.9% confidence that being a CJS employee leads to a 0.143 increase in the 
acceptability of the officer’s behavior. 
 When determining the criminality of the officer in the vignette, once again, the race of 
the officer and driver were not statistically significant (see Table 11).  Scenarios 2 and 3, 
compared to scenario 1, remained significant across all three models (99.9% confidence) while 
scenario 4 was slightly significant (95% confidence) in Model 2.  By Model 3, those that viewed 
scenario 2 were 9.629 times more likely than those who had scenario 1 to find the officer’s 
behavior to be a crime; those that had scenario 3 were 7.336 times more likely.  Like the 
previous dependent variable, the race of the respondent was significant in Model 2 (99% 
confidence), but not for Model 3.  The following variables were also significant in Model 3: 
education, sex, CJS employment, and residential race composition.  Once again, CJS 
employment stands out the most, because those employees were 3.104 times more likely to find 
the officer’s behavior to be a crime. 
 For the dependent variable of punishment, the pattern of nonsignificant values for 
Manipulations A and B continues across this variable as well (see Table 12).  Scenarios 2, 3, and 
4, compared to scenario 1, were all statistically significantly different (95%, 99.9%, and 99% 
confidence) with scenario 2 gaining an increase in significance in Model 3 (97.5%).  Notably, 
compared to scenario 1, scenario 2 was the only one to have a negative odds ratio, suggesting a 
preference for less punitiveness than the officer in scenario 1. With this dependent variable, race 
of the respondent was not significant in either model it was included.  Of the control variables in 
Model 3, only residential race composition and cooperation with police were statistically 





Table 11: Multivariate Analysis | Is it a crime? 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
 b SE OR b SE OR b SE OR 
Manipulation A 
  White (ref.) 





























  White (ref.) 





























  Scenario 1 (ref.) 
  Scenario 2 
  Scenario 3 
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Age -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.010 0.008 0.990 
Education -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.336 0.084 1.399*** 
Sex -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.568 0.186 1.765** 
Income -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.021 0.067 0.979 
Employment -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.189 0.255 0.828 
CJS Employment -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.133 0.245 3.104*** 
Marital Status -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.115 0.204 1.123 
Residential Race 
Composition 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -0.388 0.111 0.679*** 
Political Viewpoint -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.091 0.079 0.913 
Political Affiliation -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.097 0.207 1.102 
Police Legitimacy -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.189 0.104 0.828 
Cooperation with 
Police 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -0.251 0.174 0.778 
Constant -0.136 0.181 0.873 0.202 0.219 1.224 1.041 0.772 2.832 
McFadden R-Squared 0.106 0.114 0.231 
Note: ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; scenario 1: the driver complies and verbally consents to a 
search of their vehicle. While searching, the officer discovers cocaine in the vehicle and arrests 
the driver; scenario 2: the driver complies but is then thrown to the ground by the officer, placed 
in handcuffs, and taken to jail for resisting arrest; scenario 3: the driver resists leading to the 
officer trying to remove the driver from their vehicle. In the midst of the scuffle the officer ends 
up shooting and killing the driver; scenario 4: the driver resists this request and instead reaches 
for a handgun that is visibly laying on the passenger seat. The officer reacts by shooting and 







Table 12: Multivariate Analysis | Punishment 
 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
 b SE β b SE β b SE β 
Manipulation A 
  White (ref.) 





























  White (ref.) 





























  Scenario 1 (ref.) 
  Scenario 2 
  Scenario 3 
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Age -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.005 0.004 -0.043 
Education -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.002 0.051 -0.001 
Sex -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.007 0.094 -0.003 
Income -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.035 0.037 0.038 
Employment -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.173 0.142 0.050 
CJS Employment -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.138 0.110 -0.055 
Marital Status -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.026 0.114 -0.102 
Residential Race 
Composition 
-- -- -- -- -- -- 0.114 0.055 0.095* 
Political 
Viewpoint 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -0.052 0.038 -0.057 
Political 
Affiliation 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -0.012 0.106 -0.005 
Police Legitimacy -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.088 0.056 -0.071 
Cooperation with 
Police 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -0.213 0.095 -0.096* 
Constant 2.184 0.130 -- 2.222 0.142 -- 3.122 0.431 -- 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.195 0.194 0.235 
Note: ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; scenario 1: the driver complies and verbally consents to a 
search of their vehicle. While searching, the officer discovers cocaine in the vehicle and arrests 
the driver; scenario 2: the driver complies but is then thrown to the ground by the officer, placed 
in handcuffs, and taken to jail for resisting arrest; scenario 3: the driver resists leading to the 
officer trying to remove the driver from their vehicle. In the midst of the scuffle the officer ends 
up shooting and killing the driver; scenario 4: the driver resists this request and instead reaches 
for a handgun that is visibly laying on the passenger seat. The officer reacts by shooting and 





cooperation with police carries a negative relationship; neither were substantively large in 
magnitude. 
 The final dependent variable in this analysis involved whether the driver or his family 
should be able to sue the officer.  As with the previous models, Manipulations A and B were not 
statistically significant.  Scenarios 2, 3, and 4, compared to scenario 1, consistently showed 
statistical significance across all 3 models (see Table 13).  The odds that those who had scenarios 
2-4 favored the driver/his family being able to sue the officer show a positive relationship with 
tremendous difference.  In Model 3, it is said with 99.9% confidence that those who had scenario 
2 were 12.198 times more likely than those with scenario 1 to favor the driver/his family being 
able to sue the officer; scenario 3 carried an odds ratio of 9.885. Race of the respondent follows 
the pattern of being significant in Model 2 (99.9% confidence) but not Model 3.  The remaining 
significant variables are age, education, CJS employment, marital status, residential race 
composition, and police legitimacy.  CJS employment continues to stand out as employees were 
3.608 times more likely to favor the ability to sue. 
Conclusion 
 In sum, it was found that about half of the population favored qualified immunity, but 
when applied to the vignettes, over 70% believed that the driver/his family should be able to sue 
the officer for his actions during the traffic stop.  Moreover, it was shown that the neither the 
race of the officer nor the race of the driver significantly affected responses for any of the 
dependent variables.  An especially significant finding comes from CJS employment, as the 
impact of such employment continued to stand out among the control variables.  The next 





Table 13: Multivariate Analysis | Ability to Sue 
 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
 b SE OR b SE OR b SE OR 
Manipulation A 
  White (ref.) 
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  Scenario 1 (ref.) 
  Scenario 2 
  Scenario 3 
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Age -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.021 0.009 0.979* 
Education -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.241 0.087 1.273** 
Sex -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.240 0.197 1.271 
Income -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.095 0.072 0.910 
Employment -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.022 0.265 0.978 
CJS Employment -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.283 0.282 3.608*** 
Marital Status -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.617 0.217 1.853** 
Residential Race 
Composition 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -0.420 0.121 0.657*** 
Political 
Viewpoint 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -0.133 0.087 0.876 
Political 
Affiliation 
-- -- -- -- -- -- 0.356 0.227 1.428 
Police Legitimacy -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.345 0.113 0.708** 
Cooperation with 
Police 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -0.340 0.186 0.712 
Constant 0.137 0.184 1.146 0.690 0.231 1.994** 3.278 0.842 26.511*** 
McFadden R-
Squared 
0.106 0.124 0.276 
Note: ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; scenario 1: the driver complies and verbally consents to a 
search of their vehicle. While searching, the officer discovers cocaine in the vehicle and arrests 
the driver; scenario 2: the driver complies but is then thrown to the ground by the officer, placed 
in handcuffs, and taken to jail for resisting arrest; scenario 3: the driver resists leading to the 
officer trying to remove the driver from their vehicle. In the midst of the scuffle the officer ends 
up shooting and killing the driver; scenario 4: the driver resists this request and instead reaches 
for a handgun that is visibly laying on the passenger seat. The officer reacts by shooting and 





CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
Discussion 
 The data collected from this survey has provided information that can provide a new 
perspective on qualified immunity.  As the concept is primarily discussed in law reviews, data on 
the applicability to real-world situations was lacking.  In this section, I will discuss these findings 
in more detail and show just what the population had to say about it. 
Research Questions 
 To reiterate, the first research question asked, “What is the current level of support for 
qualified immunity in the context of policing?”  Based on the data, the population is split on 
favoring qualified immunity in that context (see Table 2).   When examined with multivariate 
models, every sociodemographic characteristic, with the exception of income (negative and 
significantly related), age, sex, employment, and residential racial composition, signified an 
increase in favorability, with the respondents’ race, marital status, and views on police 
legitimacy being the most significant (see Table 9).  This suggests that race plays a role in 
support for qualified immunity as White respondents favored it more than the non-White 
respondents. 
The second research question asked, “Does the race of the officer or civilian in a traffic 
interaction affect public opinion on the applicability of qualified immunity to law enforcement?”  
To answer this question, one must break down the applicability of qualified immunity into the 
variables of acceptability of officer behavior and that of the driver/his family being able to sue 
the officer.  In both cases, the race of the officer (Manipulation A in the vignette) was not 





officer vignette did not vary enough from those assigned to a white officer to say that the 
officer’s race affected them (see Tables 10 and 13).  
 The final research question reads, “What matters more to the public: the race of the 
officer or the race of the driver in a traffic interaction?”  Due to a lack of significance from either 
variable in any of the multivariate analyses, it is difficult to say which matters more.  Moreover, 
the race of the driver and the race of the officer coefficients across all models were not 
statistically significantly different from each other per Paternoster et. al.’s (1998) equality of 
coefficients test.  
Hypotheses 
 Throughout this study, I have been working under the null hypothesis that manipulating 
the races of the officer and driver will have no significant effects on participants’ opinions on the 
scenarios.  Based on multivariate analyses, I can conclude that the data supports the null 
hypothesis.  Neither Manipulation A (race of the officer) nor Manipulation B (race of the driver) 
yielded significant results for any of the follow-up question/dependent variables (see Tables 10-
13).  
 The next hypothesis addresses the support for qualified immunity.  I hypothesized that 
there would be an overall support, however, the data does not support this hypothesis.  As Table 
2 shows, there is only a 49.76% support for qualified immunity applying to law enforcement.  
However, it is worth noting that White respondents were 1.768 times more likely to favor 
qualified immunity than their non-White counterparts, which can be said with 99% confidence. 
(see Table 9). Given that White respondents were almost twice as likely to favor qualified 
immunity (see Table 9), the connection to conflict theory is strengthened, as those who are in 





than them).  Relatedly, those working in the CJS system stand to gain the most from the qualified 
immunity and are 1.65 times more likely to favor it, which is statistically significant (another nod 
to conflict theory).  Yet, in conflict with the principles of conflict theory, they were also more 
likely to favor allowing the driver or the driver’s family the ability to sue the officer.  It is 
possible that their intimate knowledge of law enforcement has given them a different expectation 
of what an officer is supposed to do. However, future research should explore this supposed 
paradox.  
 The second and third hypotheses address whether having a white driver will lead to more 
significant condemnation of the officer’s behavior and that having a white officer would result in 
more significant support for the officer’s behavior.  Based on the data, neither hypothesis is 
supported.  As shown previously, across all follow-up question/dependent variables, there is no 
significant difference between the races of the officer and driver and how they viewed the 
officer’s behavior.  There is, however, a significant difference in how what the officer did as part 
of Manipulation C and how respondents reacted.  Since the scenarios were designed to vary in 
levels of justifiability and legality, there were expected differences based on how they were 
assigned, and it was made abundantly clear that the (often cop-out) answer of, “It depends on the 
situation,” legitimately applies here.  Moreover, the differences between scenario 1 and scenarios 
2 and 3, especially when determining if the officer’s behavior was a crime (see Table 11) and if 
the driver/his family should be able to sue (see Table 13) showed that those who were assigned 
scenarios 2 and 3 yielded an OR of at least 7 for both variables.  However, the ORs for scenario 
3 were less than those of scenario 2, despite scenario 3 involving the driver dying.  This means 
that the participants were less likely to find the officer shooting the suspect as a crime than they 





 The final hypothesis addresses whether the race of the respondent significantly affects 
support for qualified immunity.  Based on the data shown in Table 9, race alone does not 
significantly affect support, however, when the control variables are added, race then becomes 
significant.  Conversely, the race of the respondent developed a pattern of being significant when 
examined alongside only the experimental manipulations when used as a predictor for the 
follow-up question/dependent variables, but loses its significance when the rest of the control 
variables are accounted for (except for the dependent variable of the officer’s punishment in 
which race was nonsignificant). 
Limitations 
 The first limitation to this study involves the vignette scenarios from Manipulation C.  
Due to the unpredictable nature of policing, it proved impossible to capture every police 
interaction within just four pre-made scenarios.  Such a limitation has hindered the level of 
generalizability of this study. 
 Along the same line, the vignettes were designed to mirror real-world situations.  This, 
coupled with the timing of the distribution of this survey (five months following the death of 
George Floyd), could have emotionally charged the respondents and altered their responses.  
However, it is impossible to determine this role of emotions in rating these scenarios.  At best, it 
can be presumed that, based on the random assignment of these scenarios to respondents, the 
emotional responses from such historical events were evenly distributed across scenarios and 
thus likely played not significant role.  
 As shown in the analyses, the most significant variable from the vignette was 
Manipulation C; the scenarios mattered the most to respondents when they answered the follow-





opinions on qualified immunity after the fact.  A preliminary opinion was gathered but there was 
no explicit question addressing how the vignette may have changed their minds.  Future research 
may wish to explore this impact. 
Implications 
 With the recent attention given by lawmakers to qualified immunity (Lacy, 2021), this 
study can be used to gain a better perspective on the state of the civilian’s support for the policy.  
The near 50/50 split in support for qualified immunity, as shown in this survey, points to a 
possible inflection point in a possible abolition of the protections of qualified immunity.  Recent 
events have shown that the scales are being tipped towards abolition as New York City (Romine, 
2021) and New Mexico have joined Colorado in ending qualified immunity for law enforcement 
(NM ended it altogether; Williams, 2021). Moreover, the multivariate analysis point to a 
potential racial division after accounting for other theoretical and sociodemographic factors. 
Thus, policymakers may wish to be attuned to such differences. 
 While being sued is one form of accountability for law enforcement, the other side (or 
addition) to that is criminal punishment.  The important aspect of that is how long they are 
punished for.  The data from this study shows that the population averages a support for the 
officer to be punished for up to 5 years in prison, with statistically significant movement towards 
the 10-year option in scenario 3 (see Table 12).  Keeping with that scenario, the driver was killed 
by the officer in that scenario, and the data shows that those who were assigned to that scenario 
were over 7 times as likely to find his actions criminal, yet they only recommended 5-10 years in 
prison.  That is less time than the average prison sentence for a manslaughter charge.  This level 





Additionally, future researchers find it fruitful to examine how Criminal Justice System 
employees view qualified immunity.  In this study, they were 1.65 times more likely to favor it 
but were also more likely to favor allowing the driver or the driver’s family the ability to sue the 
officer. 
Future Research  
 As it pertains to qualified immunity, this study is only the beginning.  There are several 
avenues that have been opened because of this research. 
 The CJS employees’ responses stood out to me as I conducted the analysis.  Less than 
30% of the respondents were employed by the CJS, yet that sample yielded statistically 
significant differences in all but one multivariate analysis.  In the future lies the potential to 
gather the thoughts of exclusively CJS employees to gain a better perspective, perhaps through a 
qualitative or mixed methods study.   
 Now that it has been revealed that is really does depend on the situation, finding out why 
would be a logical next step, inquiring on a more intimate level to understand what about the 
situations led to the data from this study.  Possible studies could include examining the 
connection between the punitiveness (or lack thereof) applied to these officers and the level of 
support for an officer’s behavior or eliminating race from the vignette altogether and repeating 
the experiment.   
Taking it a step further, providing video vignettes and comparing the reactions to them to 
those of the written vignettes would possibly provide a clearer explanation as to how the 
situation affects one’s support for qualified immunity.  Since most of the incidents I referenced 





own imagination out of the equation.  Emotion may still play a factor, but a qualitative study can 
account for that. 
 
Conclusion 
 As noted above, the policy of qualified immunity poses a complex problem in law 
enforcement, especially when examining this policy through the lens of conflict theory. Although 
there may be somewhat mixed support for this policy, the data collected can provide a clearer 
picture as to who is supporting it and why.  Pioneering a social science point of view on qualified 
immunity has given me the opportunity expand on a whole new debate among criminal justice 
scholars.  Moving forward, I hope to explore other avenues presented by this study to further 
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